Miranda

MBEMax wiki article — paired with the Criminal Procedure question set on mbemax.com.

One-line summary

Statements obtained during custodial interrogation by government agents are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief unless preceded by adequate warnings and a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of the right to silence and to counsel.

Mnemonic

C-I-W — Custody + Interrogation + Warnings/Waiver.

No C + I together? No Miranda. Warnings given but no valid waiver? Still no admission in case-in-chief.

The rule (plain-language)

Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before questioning a suspect who is in custody, police must warn that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything said may be used against him, that he has the right to counsel, and that counsel will be appointed if he cannot afford one. Once invoked, the right must be scrupulously honored.

Custody

• Whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel deprived of freedom of action in a significant way (Berkemer v. McCarty, J.D.B. v. North Carolina — age relevant for juveniles).
• Traffic stops — generally non-custodial.
• Terry stops — non-custodial unless circumstances become coercive.
• Station-house interrogation — usually custody, but not always (Oregon v. Mathiason — station questioning after suspect came voluntarily was non-custodial).
• Prison setting — Howes v. Fields: imprisonment alone doesn't mean custody for Miranda.

Interrogation

• Express questioning OR its functional equivalent — words or actions police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (Rhode Island v. Innis).
• Volunteered statements — not interrogation.
• Routine booking questions — not interrogation.
• Undercover agent questioning — not custodial interrogation because no "inherently coercive" environment (Illinois v. Perkins).

Warnings

• Must convey the four rights.
• Exact words not required; substance is enough.
• Warnings must be given before interrogation begins.

Waiver

• Must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary (Moran v. Burbine).
• May be express or implied. Silence alone is not a waiver; but answering questions after warnings = implied waiver.
• Suspect must "unambiguously" invoke the right to silence (Berghuis v. Thompkins) or counsel (Davis v. United States).

Invocations

• Right to silence (Mosley). Police may re-approach after a cooling-off period about a different crime with fresh warnings.
• Right to counsel (Edwards v. Arizona). Once invoked, all interrogation must cease; police cannot re-initiate interrogation about any crime until counsel is present or suspect re-initiates. Maryland v. Shatzer — Edwards rule lifts after 14 days of release from Miranda custody.

Effect of violation

• Statements inadmissible in prosecution's case-in-chief.
• May still be used for impeachment if voluntarily obtained (Harris v. New York).
• Physical fruits of un-Mirandized but voluntary statements are admissible (United States v. Patane).
• Subsequent Mirandized statements sometimes admissible (Oregon v. Elstad if initial statement voluntary; Missouri v. Seibert if intentional two-step).

Public-safety exception

Un-Mirandized statements admissible when police reasonably believe necessary to respond to imminent threat to public safety (New York v. Quarles).

Sixth Amendment counsel (compare)

• Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at formal charging (indictment, arraignment, preliminary hearing). Offense-specific.
• Miranda right to counsel (Fifth Amendment) arises from custodial interrogation; not offense-specific — once invoked, police cannot question about any crime until counsel present.
• Massiah v. United States — Sixth-Amendment violation to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from charged defendant in absence of counsel.

NCBE loves to test

• No C + I → no Miranda. Questioning at a traffic stop: no custody. Volunteered statements at the station: no interrogation.
• Unambiguous invocation. Suspects must clearly invoke. "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" is not enough.
• Edwards rule scope. Once right to counsel invoked, any police-initiated interrogation about any crime is off-limits (subject to Shatzer 14-day rule).
• Fruits doctrine limits. Physical evidence from un-Mirandized voluntary statement admissible (Patane).
• Impeachment. Voluntarily obtained pre-Miranda statements usable for impeachment.
• Public-safety exception. Handgun-in-supermarket fact pattern (Quarles).
• Waiver after silence. Silence alone not waiver. But answering after warnings = implied waiver.
• Two-step interrogation. Seibert — deliberate strategy to bypass Miranda by pre-questioning without warnings invalidates later confession.

Fast hypos

Hypo 1. Officer stops a driver for speeding. Before issuing ticket, officer asks "Have you been drinking?" Driver admits. Non-custodial traffic stop — no Miranda warnings required; statement admissible.

Hypo 2. Undercover officer in jail cell tells arrestee "Tell me how you pulled off the job." Arrestee confesses. No Miranda violation — custodial but not the inherently coercive police-dominated environment (Perkins).

Hypo 3. Suspect in custody says "I want a lawyer." Officers leave. An hour later, different officers re-approach to question about a separate unrelated crime. Edwards rule — all interrogation must cease about any crime; violation.

Hypo 4. Officer responding to store robbery finds suspect, handcuffs him, asks "Where's the gun?" Suspect answers. Public-safety exception — admissible (Quarles).

Case anchors

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
• Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) — functional equivalent of interrogation.
• Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) — counsel invocation.
• Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) — subsequent warned statement.
• Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) — two-step interrogation doctrine.
• New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) — public safety.
• Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) — waiver and silence.
• Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) — prison interview not necessarily custody.
• Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) — 14-day break rule.

See also

• Fourth Amendment
• Search and Seizure
• Homicide

Sources

U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010); Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).