Constitutional Law Flashcards (70 Cards)

A plaintiff must show injury in fact (a concrete and particularized harm, actual or imminent), causation (the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct), and redressability (a favorable ruling will likely remedy the injury).

As a rule taxpayers lack standing merely as taxpayers. The narrow Flast exception permits a challenge to a specific congressional exercise of the taxing and spending power that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause. It does not extend to executive-branch spending or other constitutional claims.

Generally one cannot raise another's rights, but it is allowed when the claimant has a close relationship with the third party (e.g., doctor-patient) or when the third party faces an obstacle to asserting their own rights. Associations may sue for members if members would have standing, the interest relates to the group's purpose, and individual participation is unnecessary.

Ripeness bars review of claims resting on future or speculative harm. Courts weigh the fitness of the issues for judicial decision against the hardship of withholding review. A pre-enforcement challenge is ripe when there is a credible threat of prosecution and waiting would impose real hardship.

A case is moot if the controversy has ended so there is no live dispute. Exceptions include harms capable of repetition yet evading review (e.g., pregnancy, elections), voluntary cessation by the defendant who could resume, and class actions where the named plaintiff's claim ends but others persist.

A political question is an issue committed by the Constitution to another branch or lacking judicially manageable standards. Classic examples include foreign-policy decisions, the Guarantee Clause, impeachment procedures, and partisan gerrymandering. Courts decline to decide them on separation-of-powers grounds.

The Court will not review a state judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground. If the state-law basis fully supports the result and does not depend on federal law, any ruling on the federal issue would be advisory, so review is barred.

The Eleventh Amendment (state sovereign immunity) bars private suits against a state in federal court for damages. Exceptions: suits for injunctive relief against a state officer (Ex parte Young), state consent, and valid abrogation by Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Local governments are not protected.

Congress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities and persons or things in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. For intrastate economic activity, the aggregate effect may be considered; noneconomic activity generally may not be aggregated.

Congress may regulate activity with a substantial economic effect but may not compel individuals to engage in commerce (it cannot regulate inactivity). Purely noneconomic intrastate conduct (e.g., gun possession near schools, gender-motivated violence) falls outside the power absent a real interstate link.

Congress may attach conditions to spending if they are clearly stated, related to the federal interest in the program, not unconstitutional, and not so coercive as to amount to compulsion. The spending must serve the general welfare, a requirement courts apply deferentially.

The Necessary and Proper Clause lets Congress enact laws reasonably adapted to executing its enumerated powers. It is not an independent power; it must be tied to another granted power. It cannot be used to violate other constitutional provisions.

Section 5 lets Congress enforce the Amendment by remedying or deterring violations of rights the courts recognize. The remedy must show congruence and proportionality to the violation. Congress cannot create new rights or expand the substantive meaning of the Amendment, and it may regulate only state (not private) action.

The President appoints principal officers with Senate advice and consent. For inferior officers, Congress may vest appointment in the President alone, the courts, or department heads. Congress itself may not appoint officers who wield executive power.

The President may freely remove purely executive officers. Congress may impose good-cause limits on removal of officials performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions, but it may not reserve a removal role for itself (other than impeachment) or unduly impede the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The President has a qualified privilege for confidential communications, presumptively valid for military, diplomatic, or sensitive national-security matters. The privilege yields to a demonstrated, specific need for evidence, such as in a criminal trial, as held in United States v. Nixon.

The President is the lead actor in foreign relations and as commander in chief. Executive agreements with foreign nations need no Senate approval and prevail over conflicting state law, but they yield to conflicting federal statutes and the Constitution. Treaties require two-thirds Senate consent.

Presidential authority is greatest when acting with congressional authorization, uncertain in the zone of twilight when Congress is silent, and at its lowest ebb when acting against the expressed or implied will of Congress, where the action survives only if Congress lacks power over the matter.

Express preemption arises from explicit statutory language. Implied preemption occurs through field preemption (pervasive federal regulation leaving no room for states) or conflict preemption (compliance with both is impossible, or state law obstructs federal objectives). Courts presume against preemption in areas of traditional state concern.

Under the Tenth Amendment, Congress may not commandeer states by compelling state legislatures to enact laws or directing state officials to administer or enforce a federal program. Congress may, however, regulate states through generally applicable laws and may induce action via conditional spending.

A law that discriminates against interstate commerce is virtually invalid unless it serves a legitimate noneconomic interest with no nondiscriminatory alternative. A nondiscriminatory law is upheld unless its burden on commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits (Pike balancing).

When a state acts as a buyer or seller in the market rather than as a regulator, it may favor its own residents without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. The exception does not extend to downstream restrictions imposed after the state's own transaction.

It bars a state from discriminating against out-of-state citizens regarding fundamental rights, chiefly the pursuit of a livelihood. Discrimination is allowed only if it is substantially related to a substantial state interest and nonresidents are a peculiar source of the evil. Corporations and aliens are not protected, and there is no market-participant exception.

Constitutional limits reach only governmental action. Private conduct counts when a private actor performs a traditional, exclusive public function or when the government is sufficiently entangled with the private actor (significant encouragement, joint participation, or symbiotic relationship).

When the government deprives a person of a protected liberty or property interest, it must provide fair process. The required process is set by the Mathews balancing test: the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation and value of added safeguards, and the government's interest including administrative burden. Usually notice and an opportunity to be heard are required.

Laws burdening a fundamental right trigger strict scrutiny: the law must be necessary to a compelling government interest. Laws affecting non-fundamental interests get rational basis: a legitimate interest and a rationally related means, with the challenger bearing the burden.

Recognized fundamental rights include marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and parental control of children, the right to refuse medical treatment, and travel. Most enumerated rights are incorporated and protected as well.

Strict scrutiny applies to suspect classifications (race, national origin, alienage) and fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutiny applies to quasi-suspect classes (gender, illegitimacy). Rational basis applies to all other classifications, including age, disability, and wealth.

Race, national origin, and (for state laws) alienage trigger strict scrutiny: the classification must be necessary to a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored. Intentional discrimination, not mere disparate impact, is required to trigger heightened review.

Gender classifications get intermediate scrutiny: the law must be substantially related to an important government interest, and the state must supply an exceedingly persuasive justification. Classifications based on illegitimacy also receive intermediate scrutiny.

Under rational basis, a law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The challenger bears the burden, and the law usually survives. It governs age, disability, wealth, and most economic and social legislation.

State alienage classifications generally trigger strict scrutiny, but rational basis applies under the political-function exception for jobs central to self-government (police, teachers, jurors). Federal classifications based on alienage receive only rational-basis review because of the federal immigration power.

A permanent physical occupation is always a taking. A regulation that denies all economically beneficial use is a per se taking. Otherwise courts apply the Penn Central factors: the economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.

A permit condition requiring a dedication of property must show an essential nexus between the condition and a legitimate government interest (Nollan) and rough proportionality between the condition and the projected impact of the development (Dolan).

The Contracts Clause bars states from passing laws that substantially impair existing contracts. For private contracts, a substantial impairment must serve an important purpose by reasonable and appropriate means. Public contracts (state's own) get stricter review. The Clause applies only to retroactive impairments, not future contracts, and not to the federal government.

Content-based restrictions (regulating subject matter or viewpoint) get strict scrutiny. Content-neutral time, place, and manner rules get intermediate scrutiny: they must be narrowly tailored to a significant interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.

A prior restraint stops speech before it occurs and bears a heavy presumption of invalidity. Any licensing scheme must contain narrow, definite standards and procedural safeguards. Injunctions against publication are rarely upheld absent grave, direct harm.

A law is void for vagueness if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited. A law is overbroad if it restricts substantially more protected speech than necessary; a litigant may challenge it facially even if their own speech could be regulated.

Unprotected categories include incitement to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg), fighting words, true threats, obscenity (Miller test), child pornography, and defamation. These may be regulated based on content, though not by viewpoint.

Under Miller, material is obscene if, applying contemporary community standards, the average person would find it appeals to the prurient interest; it depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and, judged by a national reasonable-person standard, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

In a traditional or designated public forum (streets, parks), content-based rules get strict scrutiny and content-neutral time, place, and manner rules get intermediate scrutiny. In a limited or nonpublic forum, regulations need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.

Truthful commercial speech about lawful activity gets intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson: the regulation must serve a substantial interest, directly advance it, and be no more extensive than necessary. False, misleading, or illegal commercial speech receives no protection.

Under the O'Brien test, a regulation of expressive conduct is valid if it is within government power, furthers an important interest unrelated to suppression of the message, and the incidental burden on expression is no greater than necessary. Flag burning and similar pure messages get full protection.

A public official or public figure must prove the statement was false and made with actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Private figures on matters of public concern need only show negligence for actual damages.

The government may not establish religion. Modern analysis asks whether the practice is consistent with historical practices and understandings, replacing the older Lemon test (secular purpose, primary effect, no excessive entanglement). Government may not favor one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.

A neutral law of general applicability that incidentally burdens religion is valid under rational basis and needs no exemption (Employment Division v. Smith). A law that targets religion or is not generally applicable triggers strict scrutiny. Government may not decide the truth of religious beliefs.

The right to interstate travel is fundamental. Durational residency requirements that burden new residents' access to vital benefits trigger strict scrutiny. The right also protects equal treatment of newly arrived citizens under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It protects rights of national citizenship, narrowly construed since the Slaughter-House Cases. Its main modern use protects the right of a newly arrived state citizen to be treated the same as longtime residents, an aspect of the right to travel.

A property interest exists when a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement created by an independent source such as statute or contract, not a mere unilateral expectation. Examples include continued public employment removable only for cause and continued receipt of welfare benefits.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act that punishes a specific person or group without trial, and it is barred for both federal and state governments. An ex post facto law retroactively criminalizes conduct, increases punishment, or reduces required evidence; it applies only to criminal laws.

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes such as self-defense in the home (Heller), and this right is incorporated against the states (McDonald). Restrictions are evaluated against the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

An association has standing if its members would have standing, the interest is germane to its purpose, and neither the claim nor relief requires individual member participation. Legislators rarely have standing; states may sue to protect quasi-sovereign (parens patriae) interests.

Congress may reach intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, aggregating across actors for economic activity (Wickard/Raich). It may not aggregate purely non-economic conduct (Lopez/Morrison) and may not compel individuals to enter commerce (NFIB).

Conditional grants must be unambiguous, related to the federal interest, and not unduly coercive. Threatening to withdraw existing funds so large as to leave no real choice is unconstitutional coercion (NFIB Medicaid holding).

Congress may enforce, but not expand or redefine, Fourteenth Amendment rights; remedial legislation must be congruent and proportional to documented violations (Boerne). §5 power reaches the states and abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity; the Commerce power does not.

Power is greatest when acting with Congress's authorization, uncertain in the "zone of twilight" of congressional silence, and weakest when acting against Congress's expressed will. Mnemonic: Maximum / Twilight / Lowest ebb. No line-item veto; impoundment limited.

Principal officers require presidential nomination + Senate confirmation; inferior officers may be vested in President, courts, or department heads. Congress cannot reserve removal of executive officers to itself. Non-delegation upheld if an "intelligible principle" guides the agency.

Speech-or-Debate Clause shields legislators for legislative acts. The President has absolute immunity from civil damages for official acts and a qualified executive privilege over communications (yielding to a demonstrated criminal-trial need, U.S. v. Nixon).

Courts presume against preemption in fields of traditional state police power; preemption requires clear congressional intent. Conflict preemption arises where compliance with both is impossible or state law obstructs federal objectives.

Private conduct becomes state action through the public-function test (exclusively/traditionally governmental, e.g., running elections/company town) or significant state involvement (encouragement, joint participation, symbiosis). Mere licensing, funding, or regulation is usually insufficient.

A protected "property" interest requires a legitimate claim of entitlement (statute/contract/rules), not a mere expectation; "liberty" includes reputation-plus and physical restraint. The deprivation must be intentional or reckless, not merely negligent (Daniels).

Post-Dobbs, abortion is no longer a fundamental right and is reviewed under rational basis. Recognized fundamental rights include marriage, contraception, procreation, family living arrangements, parental child-rearing, interstate travel, and refusal of medical treatment.

All racial classifications, even benign, get strict scrutiny. Race-conscious university admissions are now unconstitutional (SFFA v. Harvard); diversity is not a compelling interest justifying racial preferences. Remedying the state's own proven past discrimination remains a recognized compelling interest.

A permanent physical occupation, however small, is a taking (Loretto). A regulation denying all economically viable use is a taking unless background nuisance principles already barred the use (Lucas). Temporary and conditional-permit exactions also implicate the clause.

Government speech is not subject to free-speech scrutiny and may be viewpoint-based. Government may not condition a benefit on surrendering a constitutional right where the condition reaches beyond the funded program itself.

Public employees: speech on matters of public concern made as a citizen gets Pickering balancing; speech pursuant to official duties is unprotected (Garcetti). Student speech may be restricted if it materially disrupts school (Tinker).

Establishment claims now turn on historical practice and tradition rather than Lemon (Kennedy v. Bremerton). States may not exclude religious individuals/institutions from generally available public benefits solely because they are religious (Trinity Lutheran/Carson).

Trigger: A litigant seeks U.S. Supreme Court review of a state high-court decision that rests partly on state law.
The U.S. Supreme Court will decline to review a state-court judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground, because any ruling on the federal question would be advisory. A state ground is adequate if it is sufficient by itself to support the judgment regardless of how the federal issue is resolved, and independent if it does not depend on an interpretation of federal law. Where it is unclear whether the state court relied on state or federal law, the Court presumes it may exercise jurisdiction and review the federal issue.

Trigger: Congress attaches strings to federal funds to induce states to adopt a policy it could not directly compel.
Under the Spending Power, Congress may place conditions on the receipt of federal funds even in areas it could not directly regulate, provided the conditions are imposed in pursuit of the general welfare, are stated unambiguously, relate to the federal interest in the program funded, and do not require the recipient to act unconstitutionally. The financial inducement may not be so coercive that pressure turns into compulsion, which would amount to unconstitutional commandeering. This doctrine allows Congress to achieve regulatory goals indirectly that the anti-commandeering principle forbids it from achieving by direct mandate.

Trigger: A government entity adopts or curates a message and a private party claims a free-speech right to participate.
When the government itself speaks, the Free Speech Clause does not apply and the government may favor particular viewpoints without triggering forum analysis or the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. Speech is attributed to the government where the government has historically used the medium to convey its own messages, the public reasonably associates the speech with the government, and the government maintains editorial control over the content. The government's accountability for its own speech lies with the political process rather than the First Amendment.