Criminal Law & Procedure Flashcards (75 Cards)

Criminal liability requires a voluntary act or a culpable omission. Reflexes, convulsions, and acts during unconsciousness are not voluntary. Liability for an omission arises only where there is a legal duty to act (statute, contract, status relationship, voluntary assumption of care, or creation of the peril) and the ability to act.

A specific-intent crime requires intent to bring about a particular result beyond the act itself (e.g., burglary, larceny, assault, attempt, solicitation, conspiracy). A general-intent crime requires only awareness of performing the prohibited act (e.g., battery, rape). The distinction matters for defenses like voluntary intoxication and mistake.

The MPC recognizes purposely (conscious objective to cause the result), knowingly (awareness the result is practically certain), recklessly (conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk), and negligently (a gross deviation from the care a reasonable person would use). Recklessness is the default if no mental state is specified.

A strict-liability crime requires no mens rea as to at least one element; the act alone suffices. These are typically regulatory or public-welfare offenses (e.g., statutory rape, selling liquor to a minor). Mistake of fact is not a defense to a strict-liability offense.

When a defendant intends harm to one victim but harms another, the intent transfers to the unintended victim. It applies to homicide, battery, and arson. The defendant may also be liable for attempt as to the intended victim. It does not apply to attempt itself or to most other crimes.

The prosecution must prove actual cause (the result would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct) and proximate cause (the result was a foreseeable consequence). An intervening cause breaks the chain only if it is unforeseeable and superseding; ordinary medical negligence and a victim's preexisting condition do not.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Malice exists with intent to kill, intent to inflict serious bodily harm, a depraved heart (reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life), or intent to commit a felony (felony murder).

First-degree murder is typically a premeditated and deliberate killing or one committed during an enumerated felony. Second-degree murder is the default malice killing not elevated to first degree. Degrees are statutory; at common law all murder was a single offense.

Felony murder is a killing, even accidental, committed during the commission or attempted commission of an inherently dangerous felony, commonly burglary, arson, robbery, rape, and kidnapping. The malice for the felony supplies the malice for the murder.

The underlying felony must be inherently dangerous and independent of the killing (merger bars using assault). The death must be foreseeable and occur during the felony, ending once the felon reaches a place of temporary safety. Under the agency theory (majority), there is no liability for the death of a co-felon caused by a victim or police.

An intentional killing is voluntary manslaughter if committed in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation that would inflame a reasonable person, with no time to cool off and no actual cooling off. Imperfect self-defense (honest but unreasonable belief in the need for force) can also reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing resulting from criminal negligence (or recklessness under the MPC) or during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony murder (misdemeanor manslaughter). It lacks the malice required for murder.

Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive at the time of the taking. A taking under a claim of right or with intent to return is not larceny. Slight movement (asportation) suffices.

Embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of property of another by someone already in lawful possession. The key difference from larceny is that the defendant lawfully possessed the property first, then misappropriated it, rather than taking it by trespass.

False pretenses is obtaining title to property by a knowing false representation of a material fact intended to defraud. In larceny by trick, the deception obtains only possession, not title. The line turns on whether title passed.

Robbery is a larceny from the person or presence of the victim accomplished by force or intimidation. The threat or force must be used to take the property or in retaining it at the time of the taking. It is essentially larceny plus an assault element.

Common-law burglary is the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another at night with the intent to commit a felony inside. The intent must exist at the time of entry. Modern statutes often drop the dwelling, nighttime, and breaking requirements.

Common-law arson is the malicious burning of the dwelling of another. A charring of the structure is required; mere scorching or smoke damage is not enough. Modern statutes extend it to all structures, one's own property, and burnings to defraud insurers.

Kidnapping is the unlawful confinement of a person involving either movement (asportation) or concealment in a secret place. The movement must be more than incidental to another crime. Many statutes aggravate the offense when committed for ransom.

Solicitation is asking, encouraging, or commanding another to commit a crime, with the intent that the person do so. The offense is complete upon the request, whether or not the other person agrees. Solicitation merges into the completed crime or the conspiracy if the other party agrees.

Conspiracy requires (1) an agreement between two or more persons, (2) the intent to agree, and (3) the intent to achieve the unlawful objective. The majority and MPC require an overt act (even a minor preparatory step); common law did not. Conspiracy does not merge with the completed crime.

Under the Pinkerton doctrine, a conspirator is liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators that are committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of it. The MPC rejects Pinkerton, limiting liability to crimes the defendant actually aids or encourages.

Withdrawal is not a defense to the conspiracy charge itself, which is complete upon agreement (and an overt act). However, an effective withdrawal communicated to all co-conspirators can cut off liability for later substantive crimes committed by the others.

Attempt requires the specific intent to commit the target crime plus a substantial step beyond mere preparation (MPC) or, at common law, an act dangerously close to completion. Attempt merges into the completed offense. Factual impossibility is not a defense; legal impossibility is.

An accomplice is one who aids, encourages, or assists the principal with the intent that the crime be committed. An accomplice is liable for the planned crime and for all foreseeable additional crimes. Mere presence or knowledge, without assistance or encouragement, is insufficient.

The M'Naghten test asks whether a mental disease left the defendant unable to know the nature of the act or that it was wrong. The irresistible impulse test adds an inability to control conduct. The MPC test asks whether the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or to conform conduct to law. The Durham test asks whether the act was a product of mental illness.

A person may use reasonable force when reasonably believing it is necessary to defend against an imminent unlawful threat. Deadly force is allowed only against a threat of death or serious bodily harm. The original aggressor may not claim self-defense unless they withdraw or the victim escalates.

The majority rule imposes no duty to retreat before using deadly force. The minority rule requires retreat before deadly force if it can be done safely, subject to the castle doctrine exception that one need not retreat from one's own home.

A person may use force to defend a third party under the same conditions in which the third party could defend themselves. Under the majority rule the defender steps into the shoes of the victim, so a reasonable mistake about the need for force is a defense; a minority denies the defense if the third party had no actual right to defend.

Duress excuses a crime committed under a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm to the defendant or another, where a reasonable person would yield. It is not a defense to intentional murder. The threat must come from a person, distinguishing it from necessity.

Necessity justifies criminal conduct reasonably taken to avoid a greater harm caused by natural forces, where the harm avoided exceeds the harm caused. The defendant must not have created the situation, and at common law it is not a defense to homicide.

Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to specific-intent crimes, by negating that intent; it is no defense to general-intent or strict-liability crimes. Involuntary intoxication (unknowing or coerced) is treated like insanity and may be a defense to any crime.

A mistake of fact is a defense when it negates the required mental state. For specific-intent crimes, even an unreasonable mistake may suffice. For general-intent crimes, only a reasonable mistake works. It is never a defense to strict-liability crimes.

As a rule ignorance of the law is no excuse. Narrow exceptions exist where the mistake negates a specific-intent element, where the defendant reasonably relied on an official statement of law later held erroneous, or where the law was not reasonably made available.

Under the majority subjective test, entrapment requires that the criminal design originated with law enforcement and that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. Merely providing an opportunity is not entrapment. The minority objective test focuses on whether police conduct would induce a law-abiding person.

A defendant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or item seized. Standing exists for one's own body, home, and belongings, and for an overnight guest, but generally not for a mere passenger challenging a car search or someone briefly on premises for a business transaction.

A warrant must be based on probable cause, supported by oath, issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, and particularly describe the place to be searched and items to be seized. Probable cause may rest on an informant's tip evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.

Incident to a lawful arrest, police may search the arrestee and the area within their immediate control (wingspan). For a vehicle, police may search the passenger compartment only if the arrestee is unsecured and within reach or it is reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is inside. A warrant is generally needed to search a seized cell phone.

With probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence, police may search it without a warrant, including any container that could hold the object of the search. The justification is the vehicle's ready mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy.

Police may seize an item without a warrant if they are lawfully present at the vantage point, the item is in plain view, and its incriminating character is immediately apparent. No further manipulation of the object to discover its nature is allowed.

Consent must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, and police need not warn of the right to refuse. Any person with actual or apparent authority over the area may consent. A physically present co-occupant who objects defeats consent given by another.

Police may make a brief investigatory stop on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. They may conduct a frisk (a pat-down of outer clothing for weapons) only with reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous. Items recognized as contraband by plain feel may be seized.

Police may enter without a warrant in true emergencies: hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, or to render emergency aid. The exigency cannot be one the police themselves created by threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

Police may inventory a lawfully impounded vehicle or an arrestee's property without a warrant or probable cause if conducted pursuant to standardized procedures and not as a pretext to search for evidence. The purpose is to protect property and the police from claims.

The exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from using evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure in its case in chief. Its main purpose is to deter police misconduct. Illegally obtained evidence may still be used to impeach the defendant's testimony.

Evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure is generally inadmissible. Exceptions that purge the taint include an independent source, inevitable discovery, attenuation between the illegality and the evidence, and the good-faith reliance on a defective warrant.

Miranda warnings are required before custodial interrogation. Custody means a formal arrest or a restraint equivalent to it; interrogation means questioning or its functional equivalent likely to elicit an incriminating response. Warnings cover the right to silence, that statements may be used, the right to counsel, and appointed counsel if indigent.

A waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; silence alone is not a waiver. Invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous and stops all interrogation until counsel is present. Invoking the right to silence requires police to scrupulously honor it, though questioning on a different crime may resume after a break.

The privilege protects against being compelled to give testimonial evidence that could incriminate. It does not cover physical evidence such as blood, handwriting, or lineup appearance. A defendant may refuse to take the stand, but a witness must assert it question by question. Compelled testimony under a grant of immunity may be required.

Jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn or the first witness testifies in a bench trial. It bars retrial for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. Under the Blockburger test, two crimes are the same unless each requires proof of an element the other does not. The separate-sovereigns doctrine permits successive state and federal prosecutions.

The Sixth Amendment right attaches at the start of adversarial judicial proceedings (formal charge, indictment, or arraignment) and is offense-specific, applying only to the charged crime. It guarantees counsel at all critical stages, including post-charge lineups, arraignment, and trial.

Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice, a reasonable probability that the result would have differed but for the errors. There is a strong presumption that counsel acted competently.

The Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements against the accused unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Statements made primarily to meet an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial and not barred.

An identification violates due process if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Even a suggestive identification may be admitted if it is otherwise reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Lineups after formal charge also trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Solicitation and attempt merge into the completed offense, so a defendant cannot be convicted of both the attempt and the completed crime. Conspiracy does not merge; a defendant may be convicted of both the conspiracy and the completed target crime.

The guilty mind must actuate the guilty act — mens rea must exist at the moment of the actus reus, not be formed afterward. Tested where intent arises after a taking or after force.

Intent follows the act to an unintended victim for crimes against persons/property (D aims at A, hits B — guilty as to B; usually also attempt as to A). Does not apply to attempt itself.

No mens rea required — typically regulatory/public-welfare offenses, statutory rape, and selling liquor/contraband to minors. Mistake of fact is NO defense to a strict-liability crime.

Generally no defense, BUT excused if: reasonable reliance on an official statement of law (statute later overturned, court decision, official interpretation) or the mistake negates a specific intent. Reliance on private counsel is not enough.

Presence at the scene plus knowledge is insufficient — the accomplice must actually aid, abet, or encourage with intent that the crime succeed.

Common law/bilateral: needs two guilty minds (acquittal of the sole co-conspirator frees the other). MPC/unilateral: one genuine agreement suffices (feigning police informant still convicts the defendant).

At common law, voluntary abandonment is NO defense once a substantial step is taken; MPC allows a complete and voluntary renunciation defense (not motivated by a higher risk of getting caught).

False imprisonment = unlawful confinement without consent. Kidnapping = confinement plus movement (asportation) or concealment in a hidden place.

Receiving control of stolen property + knowledge it is stolen + intent to permanently deprive the owner.

Defense of others mirrors the victim's right to self-defense (reasonable belief). Property: reasonable non-deadly force only — deadly force is never permitted merely to protect property.

Once a suspect unambiguously invokes the right to counsel, police may not re-initiate interrogation on any offense until counsel is present (protection lapses only after a 14-day break in custody). Invocation must be clear.

After 6th Am. counsel attaches, the State may not use a planted informant to deliberately elicit statements; a passive "listening post" informant is permissible.

A co-occupant with common authority may consent, but a physically present co-tenant's objection defeats consent (Randolph). Apparent (reasonably believed) authority validates the search.

A frisk is a limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons only; an item is seizable under "plain feel" only if its incriminating nature is immediately apparent without manipulation.

Defendant must have a personal reasonable expectation of privacy — passengers generally lack standing to challenge a vehicle search but may challenge the stop; overnight guests have standing, casual visitors do not.

Separate sovereigns (state + federal) may both prosecute the same act without double-jeopardy bar. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn (or first witness sworn in a bench trial).

Trigger: A defendant obtains another's property through a lie, and the question is whether he gained possession or title.
Larceny by trick occurs when the defendant uses fraud or deceit to obtain only possession of property, with the owner retaining title, intending at that time to permanently deprive the owner. False pretenses occurs when the defendant's knowing misrepresentation of a material fact causes the victim to pass title to the property, not merely possession. The dividing line is therefore whether the victim intended to convey only custody or full ownership in reliance on the defendant's deception.

Trigger: A co-conspirator tries to back out before or after the agreement bears fruit.
Because conspiracy is generally complete upon the agreement (and, in most jurisdictions, an overt act), a later withdrawal does not undo liability for the conspiracy itself. A conspirator may, however, cut off liability for the substantive crimes of his co-conspirators committed after withdrawal by communicating an affirmative repudiation to every member of the conspiracy in time for them to abandon the plan. Under the Model Penal Code, a complete renunciation that thwarts the success of the conspiracy can serve as a defense even to the conspiracy charge.

Trigger: Police question a suspect without warnings to neutralize an immediate danger.
Under the public safety exception, statements obtained from a suspect's un-Mirandized custodial interrogation are admissible when the questioning is reasonably prompted by an objective concern for public or officer safety, such as locating a discarded weapon. The exception applies regardless of the officers' subjective motivation so long as the danger objectively existed. Questioning must be limited to dispelling the immediate threat rather than gathering general evidence of guilt.

Trigger: A suspect in custody makes an ambiguous or unequivocal reference to a lawyer during interrogation.
Once a suspect makes an unambiguous request for counsel during custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease until counsel is present or the suspect reinitiates contact, and this Edwards protection cannot be circumvented by later re-approaching the suspect. An ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney does not require officers to stop or to seek clarification. The Miranda right to counsel is not offense-specific, so invocation bars further interrogation about any offense while the suspect remains in continuous custody.